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______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge 
In this false advertising case, Euro-Pro Operating, LLC 
(“Euro-Pro”) appeals the District Court’s order granting a 
motion for a preliminary injunction brought by Groupe SEB 
USA, Inc. (“SEB”).  The District Court found that two 
advertising claims on Euro-Pro’s steam irons likely violated 
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and 
enjoined Euro-Pro from using those claims.  Euro-Pro raises 
several issues on appeal, but we principally consider how 
courts should interpret an advertising claim when the 
packaging or label unambiguously defines a claim term.  The 
District Court decided that the packaging’s definition of a 
claim term applies to the claim’s explicit message.  Based on 
this decision, the District Court disregarded consumer survey 
evidence offering alternative meanings for the claim term.  
We agree with the District Court and find its approach firmly 
based in false advertising law and logic.  And because we 
conclude that the District Court did not otherwise abuse its 
discretion in granting the preliminary injunction, we will 
affirm. 
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I. 
A. 
 
 SEB distributes and sells various household consumer 
products under several brand names throughout the country.  
This case involves SEB’s electric steam irons sold under the 
Rowenta brand name, namely the Rowenta Focus, Model No. 
DW5080 (“Rowenta DW5080”), and the Rowenta Steamium, 
Model No. DW9080 (“Rowenta DW9080”).  Euro-Pro 
manufactures, markets, and distributes kitchen and household 
appliances.  It sells these products under the Shark brand 
name.  The dispute here arises from advertising claims on the 
packaging of two Shark steam irons, the Shark Professional, 
Model No. GI405-55 (“Shark 405”), and the Shark Ultimate 
Professional, Model No. GI505-55 (“Shark 505”).   
 The Shark 405 packaging includes two advertising 
claims.  First, text on the bottom right of the front packaging 
asserts that the Shark 405 offers “MORE POWERFUL 
STEAM vs. Rowenta®†† at half the price.”  J.A. at A3, A805.  
The “††” characters refer to a fine-print footnote on the 
bottom of the packaging, which states that the claim is 
“††[b]ased on independent comparative steam burst testing to 
Rowenta DW5080 (grams/shot).”  Id.  Text on the top right of 
the front packaging also asserts that the Shark 405 delivers 
“#1 MOST POWERFUL STEAM*.”  Id.  Again, there is a 
fine-print reference to this claim on the bottom of the 
packaging that states the Shark 405 “*[o]ffers more grams per 
minute (maximum steam setting while bursting before water 
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spots appear) when compared to leading competition in the 
same price range, at time of printing.”  Id.  The Shark 505 
packaging makes substantially the same claims.1 
 Additionally, both the Shark 405 and the Shark 505 
include hang tags on the steam irons for store displays.  The 
hang tags claim that the Shark steam irons deliver “MORE 
POWERFUL STEAM vs. Rowenta . . . at half the price.”  
J.A. at A4.  The hang tags also include a reference stating that 
the claim is “[b]ased on independent comparative steam burst 
testing” to the respective Rowenta steam irons in 
“(grams/shot).”  Id. 
 SEB first learned of the comparative advertising 
claims on the Shark steam irons in October 2013.  Soon 
thereafter, SEB directed its internal laboratory to conduct 
testing to determine whether the claims were true.  The lab 
ran tests comparing the Shark 505 and the Rowenta DW9080.  
The tests measured (1) the variable steam rate in grams per 
minute according to International Electrical Corporation 
(“IEC”) 60311 protocol and (2) the mass of a shot of steam in 
                                              
 1 The Shark 505 packaging makes the same claims as 
the Shark 405 packaging, but the corresponding references 
are slightly different.  With respect to the first claim, the 
Shark 505 packaging states in fine print that it is “†[b]ased on 
independent comparative steam burst testing to Rowenta 
DW9080 (grams/shot).”  J.A. at A4, A806.  The second 
reference, which relates to the “#1 MOST POWERFUL 
STEAM” claim, states that it “*[o]ffers more grams per 
minute (extended steam burst mode before water spots 
appear) when compared to leading competition in the same 
price range, at time of printing.”  Id.  
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grams per shot according to IEC 60311 protocol.2  The test 
results showed that the Rowenta DW9080 performed the 
same as the Shark 505 in terms of variable steam rate in 
grams per minute, with both measuring 37 grams per minute.  
In the test measuring grams per shot of steam, the Rowenta 
DW9080 outperformed the Shark 505, with measurements of 
1.34 grams per shot and 1.00 grams per shot, respectively.   
 Because SEB’s internal test results were inconsistent 
with the Shark advertising claims, SEB commissioned SLG 
Prüf- und Zertifizierungs GmbH (“SLG”), an independent 
laboratory based in Germany, to conduct independent tests 
based on the Shark claims.  SLG tested three steam irons of 
each model in accordance with IEC 60311 protocol, and it 
delivered its findings to SEB in a comprehensive thirty-eight 
page report (“SLG Test Report”).  The SLG Test Report 
showed that the Rowenta DW5080 and the Rowenta DW9080 
outperformed the Shark 405 and the Shark 505, respectively, 
in terms of grams per minute.  For the test measuring steam 
power in grams per shot, the SLG Test Report showed that 
two of the three Shark 405 steam irons performed worse than 
all three Rowenta DW5080 steam irons, but one Shark 405 
steam iron outperformed all three Rowenta DW5080 steam 
irons.  The Rowenta DW5080’s average performance was 
                                              
2 As the District Court found, the IEC is the leading 
“international standards organization that prepares and 
publishes international standards for all electrical, 
electronic[,] and related technologies, collectively known as 
‘electrotechnology.’”  J.A. at A5.  The IEC standards for 
steam irons are laid out in IEC 60311.   
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higher than the Shark 405’s average performance.3  The SLG 
Test Report also showed that two of the three Rowenta 
DW9080 steam irons performed better in grams per shot than 
all three Shark 505 steam irons, and one Rowenta DW9080 
performed worse than all three Shark 505 steam irons.  The 
Rowenta DW9080’s average performance was higher than the 
Shark 505’s average performance.     
B. 
 On January 29, 2014, SEB filed a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, asserting claims for false advertising under the 
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and for unfair competition 
under Pennsylvania common law.  The following day, SEB 
moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Euro-Pro from 
making the claims on the Shark 405 and the Shark 505.   
 The District Court held an evidentiary hearing on 
March 19, 2014, to address SEB’s motion for a preliminary 
                                              
3 The District Court’s factual finding to the contrary 
was clearly erroneous.  The District Court miscalculated the 
average performance of the Shark 405 in terms of grams per 
shot and incorrectly stated that the Shark 405’s average 
performance was slightly higher than the Rowenta DW5080’s 
average performance.  The three Rowenta DW5080 steam 
irons that were tested produced averages of 1.30, 1.25, and 
1.07 grams per shot, yielding a combined average of 1.207.  
J.A. at A7, A617.  The three Shark 405 steam irons that were 
tested produced averages of 1.49, 0.96, and 1.02 grams per 
shot, yielding a combined average of 1.157, not 1.217 as the 
District Court found.  J.A. at A7, A619.   
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injunction.4  At the hearing, SEB introduced the 
aforementioned internal test results and the independent SLG 
Test Report to show that the claims on the Shark steam irons 
are false.  Euro-Pro introduced testimony and a study from its 
scientific expert, Dr. Abid Kemal (collectively referred to as 
the “Kemal Report”).  According to the Kemal Report, steam 
power is the kinetic energy of a steam burst divided by the 
duration of the burst.  Using this measurement for steam 
power, the Kemal Report showed that the Shark 405 and the 
Shark 505 deliver more powerful steam than the Rowenta 
DW5080 and the Rowenta DW9080, respectively.  The 
Kemal Report also showed that “the mass of a shot of steam 
expelled from [the Shark steam irons] is comparable to the 
mass of a shot of steam (grams/shot) expelled from [the 
respective Rowenta steam irons].”  J.A. at A909.  
Additionally, Euro-Pro introduced a consumer survey report 
prepared by Dr. Gary Ford (“the Ford Survey”) showing that 
consumers do not have a uniform understanding of the 
meaning of the phrase “more powerful steam.”   
 The District Court also heard testimony from SEB’s 
marketing director, Scott Pollard, about the harm to the 
Rowenta brand caused by the Shark claims.  Pollard testified 
that SEB had invested substantial resources to promote 
Rowenta as the best brand of steam irons in the eyes of 
retailers and consumers.  According to Pollard, the direct 
reference to Rowenta on the lower-priced Shark steam irons 
likely would erode the Rowenta brand’s reputation in the eyes 
of retailers, current consumers, and future consumers.   
                                              
4 The matter was resolved by a United States 
magistrate judge by consent of the parties, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).   
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 The District Court granted SEB’s preliminary 
injunction motion.  The District Court first concluded that 
SEB established a likelihood of success on the merits because 
it demonstrated that the Shark claims are literally false.  The 
District Court next found that SEB had successfully 
demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence 
of preliminary relief, relying in large part on Pollard’s 
testimony about the impact on the reputation of the Rowenta 
brand and on SEB’s goodwill.  Finally, the District Court 
concluded that the balance of harms and the public interest 
favored granting the preliminary injunction.  Notably, the 
preliminary injunction required Euro-Pro to place stickers 
over the claims on the Shark packaging and remove the hang 
tags from the steam irons.   
 Euro-Pro filed this timely appeal on May 15, 2014.  
Euro-Pro filed motions to stay the preliminary injunction in 
the District Court and in this Court, but both motions were 
denied. 
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II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1367.  We have jurisdiction over the appeal from 
the order granting the preliminary injunction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  “We review an order granting a 
preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, the factual 
findings for clear error, and the determinations of questions of 
law de novo.”  Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 
F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  We review the details of equitable relief for 
abuse of discretion.  Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 159 
(3d Cir. 1997).  
III. 
 “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy 
never awarded as of right.”  Winter v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008).  Awarding preliminary 
relief, therefore, is only appropriate “upon a clear showing 
that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”  Id. at 22.  “A 
plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that 
he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is 
in the public interest.”  Id. at 20. 
 On appeal, Euro-Pro challenges the District Court’s 
conclusions on the first and second factors in the preliminary 
injunction test: first, that SEB established a likelihood of 
success on the merits; and second, that SEB showed a 
likelihood of irreparable harm without preliminary relief.  
Euro-Pro also contends that the District Court’s injunction 
violates the First Amendment and is overbroad.   
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A. 
 SEB brought its false advertising claims pursuant to 
the Lanham Act and Pennsylvania common law.  Section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any 
goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in 
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or 
any combination thereof, or any false designation of 
origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false 
or misleading representation of fact, which— 
 . . . 
 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, 
misrepresents the nature, characteristics, 
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or 
another person’s goods, services, or commercial 
activities, 
 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who 
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by 
such act. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B).  
 
 To establish a claim for false advertising, a Lanham 
Act plaintiff must prove five elements: 
1) that the defendant has made false or misleading 
statements as to his own product [or another’s]; 2) that 
there is actual deception or at least a tendency to 
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deceive a substantial portion of the intended audience; 
3) that the deception is material in that it is likely to 
influence purchasing decisions; 4) that the advertised 
goods traveled in interstate commerce; and 5) that 
there is a likelihood of injury to the plaintiff in terms 
of declining sales, loss of good will, etc. 
 
Pernod Ricard USA, LLC v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 653 F.3d 
241, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Breathasure, Inc., 204 F.3d 87, 91–92 
(3d Cir. 2000)).5   
 A plaintiff can prevail in a false advertising action if it 
proves that the advertisement “is either (1) literally false or 
(2) literally true or ambiguous, but has the tendency to 
deceive consumers.”  Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. 
Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co., 290 F.3d 
578, 586 (3d Cir. 2002).  Proof of literal falsity relieves the 
plaintiff of its burden to prove actual consumer deception.  Id.  
Here, the only dispute is whether the Shark claims are 
literally false.   
 “A determination of literal falsity rests on an analysis 
of the message in context.”  Johnson & Johnson-Merck 
Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc., 
19 F.3d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1994).  In deciding whether an 
advertising claim is literally false, a court must decide first 
whether the claim conveys an unambiguous message and 
                                              
5 On appeal, the parties do not dispute the District 
Court’s determination that a false advertising action under 
Pennsylvania common law is identical to claims under the 
Lanham Act, except there is no interstate commerce element 
under Pennsylvania law.   
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second whether that unambiguous message is false.  Novartis, 
290 F.3d at 586.  “A ‘literally false’ message may be either 
explicit or ‘conveyed by necessary implication when, 
considering the advertisement in its entirety, the audience 
would recognize the claim as readily as if it had been 
explicitly stated.’”  Id. at 586–87 (quoting Clorox Co. P.R. v. 
Proctor & Gamble Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 35 (1st Cir. 
2000)).  Unless the claim is unambiguous, however, it cannot 
be literally false.  Id. at 587.  “‘The greater the degree to 
which a message relies upon the viewer or consumer to 
integrate its components and draw the apparent conclusion . . 
. the less likely it is that a finding of literal falsity will be 
supported.’” Id. (quoting United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 
140 F.3d 1175, 1181 (8th Cir. 1998)).  We review a district 
court’s findings that an advertising claim is unambiguous and 
literally false for clear error.  See id. at 589. 
 The District Court analyzed the two advertising claims 
at issue separately.  It first determined that Euro-Pro’s claim 
that the Shark steam irons offer “MORE POWERFUL 
STEAM vs. Rowenta” is unambiguous.  The District Court 
found that the footnote reference to this claim governs the 
claim’s meaning, as the packaging explicitly claims that the 
Shark steam irons offer more powerful steam measured in 
grams per shot than the respective Rowenta steam irons.  The 
District Court also determined that the “#1 MOST 
POWERFUL STEAM” claim is unambiguous but for 
different reasons.  Recognizing that the reference to this claim 
explicitly restricts the claim to comparisons to steam irons in 
the same price range and that Rowenta steam irons are in a 
higher price range, the District Court still found an 
unambiguous message of superiority over Rowenta steam 
irons conveyed by necessary implication due to the claim’s 
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close proximity to the “MORE POWERFUL STEAM vs. 
Rowenta” claim.  
 With respect to the question of falsity, the District 
Court found that both claims are false because all the 
scientific evidence that measured steam power in grams per 
shot and grams per minute—the measurements for steam 
power provided on the Shark packaging—disproved Euro-
Pro’s claims of superiority over Rowenta.6  The District Court 
rejected Euro-Pro’s scientific evidence, the Kemal Report, as 
irrelevant because it did not measure steam power in grams 
per shot or grams per minute.  The District Court also 
observed that Euro-Pro failed to come forward with any other 
evidence that actually supported its claims. 
1. 
 We agree with the District Court that the “MORE 
POWERFUL STEAM vs. Rowenta” claim is unambiguous.  
When a product’s packaging includes an advertising claim 
and unambiguously defines a claim term, the packaging’s 
definition of the claim term applies to the claim’s explicit 
message.  As explained below, we think this rule is consistent 
with false advertising law and common sense.   
 In certain cases, determining the message conveyed by 
a claim is a simple exercise because the claim is explicit and 
unambiguous.  See Novartis, 290 F.3d at 586.  And so it is 
here.  To make something explicit is to state it clearly and 
precisely.  Therefore, when Euro-Pro took the affirmative 
                                              
6 As previously mentioned, the District Court 
incorrectly stated that the SLG Test Report showed that the 
Shark 405’s average performance in grams per shot was 
higher than the Rowenta DW5080’s average performance in 
grams per shot.  The record shows that the opposite was true. 
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step to include a reference on the Shark packaging that clearly 
defined the key term in its claim—that steam power is 
measured in grams per shot—it made an explicit claim.  The 
claim is also unambiguous because grams per shot is a unit of 
measurement provided by the IEC, the leading independent 
publisher of standards for electrotechnology, including steam 
irons.  Thus, there is no “‘apparent conclusion’” to be drawn 
about this claim’s meaning, id. at 587 (quoting United Indus., 
140 F.3d at 1181), nor is its meaning “balanced between 
several plausible meanings,” Clorox Co. P.R., 228 F.3d at 35.  
There is only one available conclusion and only one plausible 
meaning—the claim means exactly what the reference on the 
packaging says it does.    
 Moreover, as we previously discussed, courts deciding 
whether a claim is literally false must view the claim in the 
context of the entire advertisement.  See Rhone-Poulenc, 19 
F.3d at 129.  Here, the reference that defines the meaning of 
steam power is on the Shark packaging, and the claim 
expressly links to the reference using a symbol—“††” on the 
Shark 405 and “†” on the Shark 505.  Thus, ignoring the 
reference in our analysis would be not only to read the claim 
out of context, but also to ignore part of the claim itself 
denoted by the symbol. 
 Our holding is also consistent with other areas of the 
law where courts interpreting a term’s meaning apply a 
specific definition if one is provided by the author.  See, e.g., 
Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484 (1987) (“It is axiomatic 
that the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated 
meanings of that term.”); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 
1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[O]ur cases 
recognize that the specification may reveal a special 
definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs 
from the meaning it would otherwise possess. In such cases, 
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the inventor’s lexicography governs.”); J.C. Penney Life Ins. 
Co. v. Pilosi, 393 F.3d 356, 363 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying 
Pennsylvania law to interpret an insurance contract, and 
explaining that words expressly defined in a policy will be 
given that definition by courts interpreting the policy); 12 
Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts, § 34:11, at 123 (4th 
ed. 2012) (“Another method for excluding usage is to have 
the contract define terms in a manner that is different from the 
industry or trade definitions for those terms.  Then the 
contract definitions govern and usage is inapplicable . . . .”).  
We see no reason to depart from this principle here.   
 We therefore agree entirely with the District Court that 
the reference’s definition of steam power governs the term’s 
meaning in the “MORE POWERFUL STEAM vs. Rowenta” 
claim.  Accordingly, the claim’s explicit and unambiguous 
message is that the Shark steam irons offer more powerful 
steam measured in grams per shot than the respective 
Rowenta steam irons.   
 The fact that the references are in fine-print footnotes 
and presumably less likely to be read by consumers does not 
alter our analysis, as Euro-Pro urges it should.  We 
understand that other courts have held that footnote 
disclaimers purporting to make a false or misleading claim 
literally true cannot cure the claim’s false or misleading 
message.  See, e.g., Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & 
Johnson, 654 F. Supp. 568, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).  We have 
not addressed this issue, see Pernod, 653 F.3d at 252 n.13 
(declining to address the situation when an allegedly 
misleading claim is corrected by a true statement contained in 
fine print), and we do not decide it today.  Our rather 
unremarkable holding here is analytically distinct.  It is that 
what a product’s packaging says a claim term means is in fact 
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part of the claim’s explicit message.  If that explicit message 
is both unambiguous and false, the claim is literally false. 
 Nor does the presence of consumer survey evidence 
showing alternative meanings for a defined term affect our 
holding.  Euro-Pro would have us ignore the packaging’s 
definition of steam power and instead credit consumer survey 
evidence demonstrating that the meaning of steam power is 
ambiguous. According to Euro-Pro, the District Court’s 
decision to ignore the Ford Survey is inconsistent with our 
decision in Pernod Ricard USA, LLC v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 
653 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2011).  The crux of Euro-Pro’s 
argument is that consumer surveys must be considered by 
courts in determining whether a claim’s message is 
ambiguous.  As explained below, Euro-Pro’s argument does 
not hold up.   
 In Pernod, we addressed whether courts must always 
consider survey evidence showing that consumers are misled 
by an advertising claim.  There, the appellant asserted that the 
name of a brand of rum, “Havana Club,” misled consumers 
about the brand’s geographic origin.  Id. at 247.  Beneath the 
“Havana Club” name, the label prominently stated that it was 
“Puerto Rican Rum,” an accurate statement of where the rum 
was distilled.  Id. at 245–46.  The District Court found that 
the label made no false or misleading statement, so it 
disregarded consumer survey evidence showing that eighteen 
percent of consumers were confused about the brand’s 
geographic origin.  See id. at 247–48.   
 We held that the district court properly disregarded the 
consumer survey evidence.  Our conclusion rested on the 
principle “that there is and must be a point at which language 
is used plainly enough that the question ceases to be ‘what 
does this mean’ and becomes instead ‘now that it is clear 
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what this means, what is the legal consequence.’”  Id. at 251.  
Applying this principle, we observed that the label contained 
a “factually accurate, unambiguous statement of geographic 
origin,” prominently stating that it was “Puerto Rican Rum.”  
Id. at 252.  As a consequence, we concluded that no 
reasonable consumer could be misled by the “Havana Club” 
name when it was considered in the context of this prominent 
truthful statement on the label.  Id. at 252–53.  Consumer 
survey evidence was therefore immaterial because the 
Lanham Act does not prohibit a claim that “reasonable people 
would have to acknowledge is not false or misleading.”  Id. at 
253.  But we cautioned that judges should not “lightly 
disregard” consumer surveys because they may reveal 
“potential ambiguities in an advertisement” that show 
reasonable consumers may in fact be misled by the 
advertisement.  Id. at 254–55.  Finally, we noted that “a 
district court’s decision to disregard survey evidence is 
reviewable de novo, since it is founded on a legal conclusion 
based on underlying facts, that is that no reasonable consumer 
would be misled by an advertisement.”  Id. at 255 n.18. 
 As our discussion of Pernod demonstrates, it is readily 
distinguishable from the issue before us here.  Unlike Pernod, 
the case before us involves claims of literal falsity, so 
evidence of actual consumer deception is not required.  See 
Novartis, 290 F.3d at 586.  By disregarding the consumer 
survey evidence in this case, the District Court did not make 
the same legal conclusion we recognized in Pernod: that no 
consumers could be misled by the advertisement.  The 
District Court instead made a factual finding about what the 
claim means and that its message is clear and unambiguous.   
 Pernod does not license courts to use consumer survey 
evidence to define the meaning of words in an advertising 
claim.  In fact, our analysis in Pernod recognized that words 
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may be used plainly enough and carry baseline meanings such 
that consumer survey evidence is irrelevant.  See 653 F.3d at 
251 (discussing Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 201 
F.3d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 2000), opinion amended on denial of 
reh’g, 209 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that “never 
before has survey research been used to determine the 
meaning of words, or to set the standard to which objectively 
verifiable claims must be held”)).  In this case, Euro-Pro 
plainly explained on the packaging what it meant by its claim, 
so we are puzzled by Euro-Pro’s characterization of the 
District Court’s approach as a court inserting its “own 
perception” ahead of consumer perception.  Appellant’s 
Opening Br. at 33.  Far from using its own perception of the 
claim’s meaning, the District Court used the definition 
provided by Euro-Pro in the reference, and, concluding that 
Euro-Pro’s message was explicit and unambiguous, it 
reasonably declined to substitute the uninformed first 
impressions of consumers about the claim’s meaning.  See 
Mead Johnson, 201 F.3d at 886.  Euro-Pro chose a definition 
for steam power and now must live with it.  It cannot use a 
consumer survey to create an ambiguity out of whole cloth.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not err 
in failing to consider the Ford Survey in its analysis.7  
                                              
7 Citing language from the District Court’s 
memorandum opinion denying a stay of the preliminary 
injunction, Euro-Pro also argues that the District Court 
improperly based its finding that the message is unambiguous 
on its finding that the message is literally false.  Appellant’s 
Opening Br. at 33.  A summary reading of the District Court’s 
opinion granting the preliminary injunction belies this 
argument.  The District Court first concluded that the 
message is unambiguous and then found the message is 
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 Turning to the “#1 MOST POWERFUL STEAM” 
claim, we again agree with the District Court that this claim 
unambiguously conveys that Shark steam irons deliver more 
powerful steam than Rowenta steam irons.  Unlike the 
“MORE POWERFUL STEAM vs. Rowenta” claim, however, 
the relevant message here is not explicit.  The corresponding 
reference to the “#1 MOST POWERFUL STEAM” claim 
states that the Shark steam irons “[o]ffer[] more grams per 
minute . . . when compared to leading competition in the 
same price range,” and the parties agree that Rowenta steam 
irons are in a different price range.  But, as we discussed 
earlier, a literally false claim may also be conveyed by 
necessary implication when considering the advertisement in 
its entirety.  See Novartis, 290 F.3d at 586–87.  The question 
here is whether, “based on a facial analysis of the product 
name or advertising, . . . the consumer will unavoidably 
receive a false message.”  Id. at 587. Here, the answer is yes.  
The “#1 MOST POWERFUL STEAM” claim appears 
directly above the “MORE POWERFUL STEAM vs. 
Rowenta” claim, and the proximity of the two claims 
necessarily and unavoidably conveys a message that Shark 
steam irons offer the most powerful steam, even when 
compared to Rowenta steam irons.  We therefore cannot say 
the District Court’s finding is clearly erroneous.   
2. 
 Having decided that the claims convey unambiguous 
messages, the next question is whether those messages are 
false.  We find no clear error in the District Court’s 
determination that the messages are false.  The District Court 
reasonably relied on SEB’s internal test results and the SLG 
Test Report.  Both tests measured steam power in grams per 
                                                                                                     
literally false.  J.A. at A12–14. 
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shot and grams per minute—the measurements for steam 
power provided on the Shark packaging—in accordance with 
independent, objective standards promulgated by the IEC.  
Both tests also showed that the Rowenta steam irons either 
outperformed or performed as well as the Shark steam irons.  
Moreover, the Kemal Report acknowledged that there is no 
difference in grams per shot of steam between the Shark 
steam irons and the respective Rowenta steam irons.  Put 
simply, all the relevant evidence before the District Court 
refuted Euro-Pro’s claims of superiority. 
 Euro-Pro makes one final argument in an effort to 
overcome the District Court’s finding of literal falsity.  
According to Euro-Pro, the District Court improperly shifted 
the burden of proof away from SEB to Euro-Pro.  In addition 
to the rule that the party seeking preliminary relief bears the 
burden of satisfying the four-factor test, ECRI v. McGraw-
Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987), the general rule 
in false advertising cases is that a plaintiff bears the burden of 
proving falsity, Novartis, 290 F.3d at 589.  But in Novartis, 
we recognized an exception to the general rule and held that 
“a court may find that a completely unsubstantiated 
advertising claim by the defendant is per se false without 
additional evidence from the plaintiff to that effect.”  Id. at 
590.  Euro-Pro argues that the Novartis exception only 
applies when a defendant refuses to present any evidence to 
support the truth of its claim.  According to Euro-Pro, unlike 
the defendant in Novartis, Euro-Pro provided “robust” and 
uncontroverted evidence—the Kemal Report.  Appellant’s 
Opening Br. at 24. 
 We do not read Novartis so narrowly.  Euro-Pro fails 
to appreciate that the Kemal Report is mostly irrelevant to the 
messages actually conveyed by the Shark claims.  The Kemal 
Report’s primary conclusion is that the Shark steam irons 
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have more powerful steam than the respective Rowenta steam 
irons when steam power is measured by calculating the 
kinetic energy of a steam burst over the burst’s duration.  But 
Euro-Pro does not, and cannot, argue that the Kemal Report 
supports the claims that the Shark steam irons offer more 
powerful steam measured in grams per shot or grams per 
minute than the respective Rowenta steam irons.  In fact, as 
we previously mentioned, the Kemal Report concedes that the 
Shark steam irons deliver the same grams per shot of steam as 
the respective Rowenta steam irons.  Therefore, Euro-Pro’s 
claims are entirely unsubstantiated and exactly like the claims 
in Novartis.   
 But even though Novartis permits a finding of falsity 
based on Euro-Pro’s failure to come forward with any 
evidence to support its claims, we note that the District Court 
relied on SEB’s affirmative showing of falsity at least as 
much as it relied on Euro-Pro’s failure to substantiate its 
claims.  We therefore cannot say that the District Court 
shifted the burden of proof at all.  Thus, the District Court’s 
finding that the claims are false is not clearly erroneous.   
  Accordingly, the District Court correctly decided that 
SEB established a likelihood of success on the merits.    
B. 
Euro-Pro next argues that the District Court erred by 
finding that SEB established a likelihood of irreparable harm 
in the absence of preliminary relief.    
 We recently clarified the standard for irreparable harm 
in Lanham Act cases in Ferring Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 765 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2014).  
There, we held that “a party seeking a preliminary injunction 
in a Lanham Act case is not entitled to a presumption of 
irreparable harm but rather is required to demonstrate that she 
 23 
is likely to suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is not 
granted.” Id. at 217.  Of particular relevance to this case, our 
analysis in Ferring relied in large part on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 
U.S. 388 (2006).  In eBay, the Supreme Court held that 
“broad classifications” and “categorical rule[s]” about when 
injunctions should issue are inconsistent with exercising 
“equitable discretion” pursuant to traditional equitable 
principles.  547 U.S. at 393–94.  Like the Patent Act at issue 
in eBay, “[t]he Lanham Act’s injunctive relief provision is 
premised upon traditional principles of equity.”  Ferring, 765 
F.3d at 214 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a)).  It follows that a 
presumption, or categorical rule, of irreparable harm in 
Lanham Act cases is inconsistent with exercising discretion 
according to traditional equitable principles.  Id. at 215–16.  
Our decision in Ferring also emphasized that courts may 
award preliminary injunctive relief only upon a “‘clear 
showing’” of a likelihood of irreparable harm.  Id. at 217 
(quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 22). 
 Although the District Court below did not have the 
benefit of our holding in Ferring, it presciently declined to 
apply a presumption of irreparable harm, at least overtly.  The 
District Court decided that: 
[A]lthough the Third Circuit held in [Kos 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 
726 (3d Cir. 2004)] that a court may find a 
presumption of irreparable injury if a likelihood of 
success on the merits is proved, the Supreme Court’s 
later decisions in eBay and Winter . . . indicate that 
such a presumption no longer exists in the Lanham Act 
context.  Consequently, [SEB] bears the burden of 
showing that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in 
the absence of preliminary injunctive relief.   
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J.A. at A17. 
 In spite of the District Court’s express disavowal of a 
presumption, Euro-Pro contends that the District Court erred 
by applying a relaxed standard and a de facto presumption in 
determining that SEB demonstrated a likelihood of 
irreparable harm.  On the one hand, we agree with Euro-Pro 
that portions of the District Court’s opinion may be construed 
as applying a relaxed standard.  For example, the District 
Court stated that a likelihood of irreparable harm is proven if 
a plaintiff establishes “a reasonable basis for the belief that it 
is likely to be damaged as a result of the false advertising.”  
J.A. at A18 (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted).  
In Novartis, we rejected this very standard.  290 F.3d at 595.  
The District Court also cited repeatedly to a case that relied, 
at least in part, on a presumption of irreparable harm.  J.A. at 
A18–20 (citing W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Totes Inc., 788 
F. Supp. 800, 811 (D. Del. 1992)).  But other parts of the 
District Court’s opinion, including its detailed discussion of 
the specific claims, the relationship between the competing 
products, and SEB’s explanation of the likely injury to the 
Rowenta brand’s reputation, as well as its conclusion that 
SEB “convincingly demonstrated” a likelihood of irreparable 
harm, are consistent with Ferring.  J.A. at A18–20.  It is 
therefore unclear whether the District Court’s reference to the 
wrong standard actually affected the substance of its analysis.  
 We need not dwell on the question, however, because 
even if the District Court erred by reciting and applying the 
wrong standard, we may uphold the District Court’s finding 
of a likelihood of irreparable harm if it is supported by 
sufficient evidence in the record.  See Novartis, 290 F.3d at 
595–96.  Here, the record contains sufficient evidence of 
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likely harm to the Rowenta brand’s reputation and SEB’s 
goodwill.  See S & R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., 968 F.2d 
371, 378 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Grounds for irreparable injury 
include loss of control of reputation, loss of trade, and loss of 
goodwill.”).  The District Court credited the testimony of 
Pollard, SEB’s marketing director, that Rowenta steam irons 
enjoy strong reputations among retailers and consumers as the 
premier steam-iron brand on the market, and that this first-
rate reputation is the result of substantial SEB investments in 
advertising, promotion, and product development.  In 
addition, the District Court found that Rowenta and Shark 
steam irons compete against each other, that they are often 
sold side-by-side on retail shelves, and that relative steam 
power is an important factor for consumers.  And most 
importantly, the District Court credited Pollard’s testimony 
that the claims on the Shark steam irons, which, to be clear, 
are “literally false, unsubstantiated comparative claims that 
identify its competitor by name,” would likely harm the 
Rowenta brand’s reputation among retailers and consumers, 
especially because Shark steam irons are lower-priced.  J.A. 
at A19–20.  Finally, the District Court found that the harm to 
SEB would be impossible to calculate monetarily. 
 By finding that SEB established a likelihood of 
irreparable harm, we are not connecting these facts using a 
veiled presumption of irreparable harm.  Ferring bars such a 
presumption; we emphasize, however, that Ferring does not 
bar drawing fair inferences from facts in the record.  Indeed, a 
key lesson from Ferring is that courts considering whether to 
grant injunctive relief must exercise their equitable discretion 
in a case-by-case, fact-specific manner.  A critical aspect of 
fact-finding in this and other contexts is drawing reasonable 
inferences from facts in the record.  See generally Anderson 
v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) 
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(explaining that the clearly erroneous standard of review 
applies to findings that rest on “inferences from other facts”).  
The inference drawn by Pollard, the District Court, and now 
this Court—that SEB is likely to suffer irreparable harm to its 
brand reputation and goodwill—is supported not by a general 
rule or presumption but by the literally false comparative 
advertising claims at issue, the competitive relationship 
between the parties and products, and the judgment of Pollard 
that the harm to SEB’s brand reputation and goodwill is 
impossible to quantify.  Nor does Ferring change the rule that 
harm to reputation and goodwill constitutes irreparable harm, 
so long as the plaintiff makes a clear showing.  Based on the 
facts of this case, we conclude that SEB clearly showed a 
likelihood of irreparable harm to its brand reputation and 
goodwill.8    
                                              
8 In a concurring opinion in eBay, Chief Justice 
Roberts noted that it “is not surprising” that injunctions are 
granted in a vast majority of patent infringement suits because 
it is difficult to protect a patentee’s right to exclude through 
monetary damages.  See eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring).  Although this trend does not “justify a general 
rule” that injunctive relief should be granted whenever there 
is patent infringement, the Chief Justice cautioned that neither 
should it be forgotten entirely when courts apply the 
traditional four-factor test.  Id.  “When it comes to discerning 
and applying [legal] standards, in this area as others, a page of 
history is worth a volume of logic.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also id. at 395–97 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (agreeing that “history may be instructive in 
applying [the four-factor] test” but primarily “when the 
circumstances of a case bear substantial parallels to litigation 
the courts have confronted before”).   
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 Accordingly, any error committed by the District 
Court was harmless because there is sufficient evidence in the 
record to support a finding that SEB is likely to suffer 
irreparable harm without preliminary relief.  
C. 
 
 Euro-Pro’s final challenge is to the constitutionality 
and scope of the District Court’s injunction.  “District Courts 
are afforded considerable discretion in framing injunctions.”  
Meyer v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc., 648 F.3d 154, 169 (3d Cir. 
2011).  At the same time, an injunction “should be ‘no more 
burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide 
complete relief to plaintiffs.’”  Novartis, 290 F.3d at 598 
(quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)).  
                                                                                                     
The same point applies here, though for reasons 
particular to false advertising.  In Ferring, we observed that 
other Courts of Appeals applied a presumption of irreparable 
harm in false comparative advertising cases like this one.  See 
765 F.3d at 210–11.  We distilled a twofold justification for 
the presumption: “(1) a misleading or false comparison to a 
specific competing product necessarily causes that product 
harm by diminishing its value in the mind of the consumer, 
similar to trademark infringement cases; and (2) the harm 
necessarily caused to reputation and goodwill is irreparable 
because it is virtually impossible to quantify in terms of 
monetary damages.”  Id. at 211.  We also noted that we 
applied a presumption of irreparable harm for substantially 
the same reasons in trademark infringement cases.  Id. at 
211–12.  Although we no longer apply a presumption, the 
logic underlying the presumption can, and does, inform how 
we exercise our equitable discretion in this particular case.   
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“Moreover, because commercial speech is entitled to 
appropriate protection under the First Amendment, an 
injunction restraining allegedly false or misleading speech 
must be narrowly tailored to cover only the speech most 
likely to deceive consumers and harm [the plaintiff].”  Id. 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 Here, the District Court’s order granting the 
preliminary injunction requires Euro-Pro to place stickers 
over the “MORE POWERFUL STEAM vs. Rowenta” and the 
“#1 MOST POWERFUL STEAM” claims on both the Shark 
405 and the Shark 505.   Also, the order directs Euro-Pro to 
remove the hang tags from the steam irons. 
 Commercial speech conveying a literally false 
message is not protected by the First Amendment.  See id. 
(“We conclude that the injunction does not violate the First 
Amendment . . . because each of these messages is false.”).  
As we have explained, we agree with the District Court’s 
conclusion that SEB will likely prevail on its false advertising 
claims.  Therefore, we see no First Amendment violation.  
 Euro-Pro contends that the District Court’s injunction 
is overbroad because it requires Euro-Pro to cover the 
advertising claims themselves rather than only the references 
to the claims.  Euro-Pro correctly points out that the 
references are critical to the literal falsity analysis.  Without 
the definitions from the references, the claims about relative 
steam power may be considered ambiguous, and as such, 
could not be literally false.  See id. at 587.  Thus, Euro-Pro 
argues that the injunction should have targeted only the 
references.   
 We disagree with Euro-Pro’s narrow characterization 
of its advertising claims.  Although the references provide the 
definition for steam power that the District Court 
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appropriately adopted in this case, the references and the 
advertising claims together compose the literally false 
messages.  Therefore, the injunction is not overbroad because 
it is limited to reaching claims that are literally false.  See 
Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 949 (3d Cir. 
1993).  Moreover, the logic underlying Euro-Pro’s argument 
would create an unworkable framework.  Under Euro-Pro’s 
suggested approach, district courts could not just enjoin the 
dissemination of literally false advertising claims, but they 
also would need to parse each part of those literally false 
claims to see if the removal of a word or a portion here and 
there would render the remainder true.  We cannot say that 
the District Court abused its discretion when it required Euro-
Pro to place stickers over the entirety of the false advertising 
claims rather than only part of them. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we find no abuse of 
discretion by the District Court granting SEB’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction.  Accordingly, we will affirm. 
 
